CMA Secures EMA Green Light: A Game-Changer for WM!

Introduction

Comerica Incorporated (NYSE: CMA) – a Dallas-based regional bank – is at the cusp of a transformative merger that could reshape its future. In October 2025, Fifth Third Bancorp agreed to acquire Comerica in an all-stock $10.9 billion deal, forming the 9th-largest U.S. bank by assets ([1]). The merger aims to expand the combined bank’s footprint across high-growth markets (Texas, California, the Midwest, etc.) and diversify its revenue streams ([1]) ([1]). Notably, Comerica’s leadership will have a strong presence in the new entity – its CEO is slated to become Vice Chair, and its Banking Officer will lead the wealth & asset management (WM) division ([1]). Management expects this tie-up to be a “game-changer” for wealth management, with the combined bank poised to grow two $1 billion+ high-return fee businesses, including an enhanced WM arm ([1]). This report examines Comerica’s fundamentals – from dividend policy and leverage to valuation and risks – as the bank secures approvals (i.e. regulatory green lights) for this milestone initiative.

Dividend Policy & History

Steady Payouts: Comerica has a track record of regular dividends, paying $0.71 per share quarterly (raised from $0.68 in early 2023) ([2]). This amounts to an annualized $2.84 per share dividend – a level the bank has maintained even through recent industry turmoil ([3]). At a mid-2025 share price around $68–$70, that translates to a dividend yield in the ~4% range ([4]), reflecting an attractive income stream for investors. The Board last increased the dividend by 4% in Q1 2023, signaling confidence just weeks before the spring 2023 regional-bank crisis ([2]). Since then, Comerica has held the payout steady at $0.71, prioritizing consistency. Management appears committed to the dividend, but also remains mindful of regulatory guidance that banks “should not” boost or maintain dividends if earnings cannot support them ([3]). In 2023, net income covered the common dividend 2.3× (payout ~44% of earnings) ([3]) ([3]), which is a reasonable coverage. However, as discussed below, profit pressures in 2024 have tightened this cushion. Going forward, dividend policy will likely be evaluated in the context of merger integration – e.g. aligning with Fifth Third’s dividend strategy – and capital needs under new regulatory expectations.

Leverage, Capital Structure & Debt Maturities

Capital and Leverage: Comerica entered 2024 with solid regulatory capital buffers. Its Common Equity Tier-1 (CET1) ratio stood at 11.1% (well above the 6.5% “well-capitalized” benchmark) ([3]) ([3]). Management targets ~10% CET1 as an operating level ([3]), so the bank has been running slightly higher, likely to guard against uncertainty. Tangible common equity (TCE) represented 6.3% of assets at year-end 2023, up from 4.9% a year prior ([3]) ([3]). Importantly, Comerica’s shareholders’ equity still carries about $3.0 billion in unrealized losses on securities (AOCI) from the rapid 2022–23 rate spike ([3]). While these paper losses improved as interest rates stabilized (boosting TCE ratio in 2023) ([3]), ([3]) they underscore the bank’s interest-rate exposure.

Funding Mix: The bank’s deposit base was significantly reshuffled by the 2023 banking-sector turmoil. Total deposits at Dec 31, 2023 were $66.8 billion, down ~$4.6 billion (–6.5%) from a year earlier ([3]). Critically, noninterest-bearing deposits plunged by $12.1 billion as many clients diversified funds after the Q1 2023 bank runs, while Comerica offset about $7.5 billion of that outflow by enticing customers into higher-yielding deposits ([3]). In other words, a chunk of the cheap checking deposits left, and the bank had to replace them with more expensive interest-bearing accounts (e.g. money markets, CDs). This shift drove a sharp increase in funding costs and compressed margins (explored later). To plug remaining gaps, Comerica leaned on wholesale borrowing: Medium- and long-term debt soared to $6.2 billion outstanding (Dec 2023), up $3.2 billion from a year prior ([3]). Much of this came via Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances, tapped in 2023 to bolster liquidity ([3]). Indeed, average long-term borrowings roughly doubled to ~$5.8 billion in 2023 vs $2.8 billion in 2022 ([3]), as Comerica replaced lost deposits with FHLB funds and other term debt. Total borrowed funds (including short-term facilities) reached $9.8 billion – a 57% jump year-over-year ([3]) ([3]).

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Maturity Profile: This heavier debt load brings rolling maturities that the bank must manage. In particular, 2025 will see a large maturity wall – about $2.75 billion of Comerica’s term debt falls due in that year ([3]). (By comparison, only ~$0.5B comes due in 2024, and ~$2.0B in 2026 ([3]).) The 2025 maturities are nearly 44% of the $6.3B total medium/long-term debt, so refinancing or repaying that will be a key focus. The pending merger could help by providing a stronger combined balance sheet and potentially better credit ratings to roll over debt at reasonable cost. For now, the bank has ample regulatory capital and has maintained nominal liquidity coverage above required minimums. But the quality of capital and funding has changed: a higher proportion of interest-sensitive deposits and wholesale debt means Comerica’s leverage is more costly. This dynamic makes the bank’s earnings and dividend more sensitive to interest rate movements, as seen in recent quarters.

Financial Performance & Dividend Coverage

Earnings Under Pressure: After a banner profit in 2022, Comerica’s earnings have been squeezed by the new rate environment. Full-year 2023 net income dropped to $881 million (or $6.44 per diluted share), down 23% from $1.15 billion in 2022 ([3]). The fall stemmed largely from surging interest expense and higher provision for credit losses, which outweighed gains in loan interest income ([3]). Notably, net interest income (NII) still grew ~2% in 2023 as loans repriced higher ([3]), but this trend reversed entering 2024. By the first quarter of 2024, NII was down 23% year-on-year ([5]) – a stark reversal – because deposit costs caught up and loan growth stalled. Comerica actually warned that 2024 NII could decline ~11% for the full year ([5]). As a result, Q1 2024 profit plunged 57% versus the prior year ([5]), and Q2 results were similarly weak across regional banks ([6]). Bank management responded by emphasizing cost control and efficiency improvements to protect the bottom line ([6]). They also took steps to reduce asset sensitivity (e.g. hedging some fixed-rate assets) to stabilize NII.

Despite these headwinds, Comerica has remained profitable each quarter and continues to comfortably cover its dividend out of earnings. The $2.84 annual dividend consumed roughly 44% of 2023’s core earnings ([3]) ([3]). However, with net income running lower in 2024, the payout ratio is likely rising into the ~50–60% range (depending on second-half results). Regulators generally frown on banks paying more in dividends than they earn ([3]), so this is a space to watch. Dividend coverage still appears adequate – for example, even in a tough Q1 2024, Comerica’s quarterly net income exceeded the $0.71 dividend by a safe margin. And management has not signaled any intent to cut the payout at this stage. In fact, maintaining the dividend likely serves to project confidence and stability amid market skepticism.

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Asset Quality and Loss Coverage: A relative bright spot for Comerica has been credit quality. Thus far, the bank has avoided major credit losses despite higher interest rates. Net charge-offs remained very low in 2022–23, and management noted credit metrics were “positive” as of early 2024 ([5]). That said, with economic growth slowing, loan loss provisions have begun to rise from unusually low levels. In 2023 the bank added to reserves (a $89M provision) after actually releasing reserves in 2021 ([3]). By mid-2024, Comerica and peers started boosting provisions for potential losses in areas like commercial real estate and consumer lending ([6]). Commercial real estate (CRE) is a particular focus: about 36% of Comerica’s loan book is in CRE, including developer and office loans ([3]). Internally classified “criticized” CRE loans (an early warning metric) climbed to ~$773 million by end of 2023 (from ~$167M in 2022), especially in the multi-family segment ([3]). While actual non-performing loans remain low, this uptick bears watching. The bank’s reserve coverage appears reasonable for now, and its Tier-1 capital provides a solid loss-absorbing buffer ([3]) ([3]). Still, if a recession or severe real-estate downturn hits, Comerica could face higher credit costs that further crimp earnings. So far management is proactively addressing risks – scaling back exposure in vulnerable portfolios (e.g. exiting some mortgage banking lines ([3])) and tightening underwriting standards. The coming merger with Fifth Third also promises a more diversified loan mix and broader deposit base, which could improve overall credit resilience.

Valuation and Comparables

Stock Performance: Comerica’s stock has rebounded strongly from the 2023 banking scare, but volatility remains. During the March 2023 regional bank crisis, CMA shares briefly plunged into the low $30s – implying a valuation near or even below the bank’s tangible book value (~$32 per share at the time) ([3]) ([3]). Confidence recovered over the following year, and by October 2025 the stock traded around $75–$80 on merger news ([7]) ([8]). The acquisition terms value CMA at $82.88 per share ([8]), which equates to roughly 2.0× Comerica’s tangible book (TCE of $40.70 per share at YE 2023) ([3]). This is a healthy premium to most regional-bank peers, reflecting Comerica’s attractive footprint and the anticipated synergies for the buyer. Even before the deal, CMA was modestly priced: at ~$68.7, it sported a forward P/E of ~13× ([4]) and a dividend yield north of 4% ([4]) – indicating a market discount for uncertainty. By comparison, the S&P 500’s forward P/E is much higher, whereas many mid-sized banks have been trading at single-digit P/Es and ~1× book in 2023–24. The Fifth Third offer thus delivers a substantial uplift for Comerica shareholders, who will own about 27% of the combined bank post-merger ([1]). The transaction is all-stock, so CMA investors will effectively roll into Fifth Third shares (1.8663 FITB shares for each CMA share) ([1]). Pro forma, they gain exposure to a larger, more diversified institution – which could warrant a higher valuation multiple if synergies are realized.

Comps and Outlook: In the standalone sense, Comerica’s valuation has been constrained by its regional-bank profile: heavy reliance on net interest income and a concentrated deposit base can mean lower earnings multiples in a high-rate, high-competition environment. The bank’s return on equity (ROE) was solid (roughly 13% in 2022, dropping to ~10% in 2023 as profits fell) – respectable but not exceptional. Its price-to-tangible book at the deal price (~2×) is at the upper end of the range for regional banks of similar size (many of which trade at 1.0–1.5× TBV). This suggests Fifth Third and the market see unique value in Comerica’s franchise (e.g. its presence in Texas and California, and a strong middle-market commercial customer base). Another interpretation is that the deal price bakes in significant cost savings and revenue enhancements. The banks expect to streamline overlapping functions and cross-sell services, especially boosting fee income like wealth management and payments (two areas set to generate ~$1B each in annual revenue for the combined company) ([1]). If those goals are credible, the higher multiple is justified by future growth. It’s worth noting that Comerica’s current stock price mostly reflects the merger terms; absent the deal, the stock might trade lower given the industry challenges. Thus, valuation upside from here hinges on successful integration – something investors will be evaluating in quarters ahead.

Risks and Red Flags

While Comerica has navigated recent challenges, several risk factors and uncertainties remain:

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Deposit Retention & Funding Costs: The loss of cheap deposits in 2023 exposed a vulnerability in Comerica’s funding mix ([3]). There is continued risk that large uninsured or rate-sensitive depositors could flee to alternatives (higher-yield money funds, larger banks) if Comerica doesn’t stay competitive on rates. Every 1% shift of deposits into higher-cost tiers squeezes net interest margin. The bank’s greater reliance on FHLB loans and other wholesale funding ([3]) means it is more sensitive to interest rate swings and credit market conditions. If the Fed keeps rates “higher for longer,” interest expense will remain elevated, pressuring profits. Conversely, in a falling-rate scenario, deposit costs might lag on the way down, offering some relief – but only if customers stick around.

Interest Rate and Market Risk: Comerica’s balance sheet still has a mismatch in durations that caused the $3 billion in unrealized bond losses (AOCI) ([3]). A further rise in long-term interest rates could deepen these losses and erode capital (or force the bank to hold underwater securities to maturity). Rising rates also cool loan demand – Comerica already noted tepid loan growth and softer loan pipelines as clients face higher borrowing costs ([5]). Additionally, higher rates depress the value of fee-based businesses (e.g. wealth management assets under management could decline if markets drop). The bank does hedge interest rate exposure to some extent, but it’s not immune to macro swings.

Credit Quality Deterioration: Thus far credit losses have been minimal, but economic stress could change that. Comerica has substantial exposure to Commercial Real Estate (over one-third of its loan book) ([3]), including office and retail properties that are under pressure from high vacancies and financing costs. “Criticized” loans in CRE rose in 2023 ([3]), hinting at early issues. Consumer lending (like indirect auto loans via its Dealer Services unit) could also see higher defaults if unemployment rises. The reserve coverage and capital buffer can absorb a reasonable uptick in losses, but a severe recession or a commercial real estate downturn is a significant risk to CMA’s earnings and possibly its dividend.

Regulatory and Capital Requirements: Regulatory scrutiny of mid-sized banks has increased since the 2023 crisis. Comerica (~$85B assets) will be merging into a ~$280B asset bank – potentially subjecting it to stricter rules (the Fed’s proposed “Basel Endgame” rules would raise capital charges on banks over $100B in assets). While regulators appear supportive of consolidation (as a way to bolster stability) ([1]), they will still demand a robust post-merger capital plan. There is a risk that higher capital requirements or supervisory actions could limit shareholder returns (for example, requiring earnings to be retained/reinvested rather than paid out as dividends or buybacks ([3]) ([3])). Additionally, any delay or issue in regulatory approval of the Fifth Third deal would create uncertainty – though none is expected at this time.

Integration and Execution Risks: The planned merger is a complex undertaking. Integration risks include combining IT systems, corporate cultures, and customer-facing operations across two banks with different histories. Comerica’s and Fifth Third’s product offerings and geographic focus have overlaps but also differences; melding them smoothly is critical. If cost synergies (branch consolidations, headcount reductions, etc.) fall short or encounter delays, the financial benefits could be less than projected. Likewise, achieving revenue synergies (like cross-selling wealth management services to Comerica’s commercial clients, or vice versa) is not guaranteed. Any missteps could affect the combined bank’s profitability and reputational standing. Moreover, during the interim period before the deal closes (expected by Q1 2026 ([1])), Comerica must continue to operate independently – meaning it needs to manage its risks and capital without fully leveraging Fifth Third’s resources yet. This “limbo” period could be challenging if economic conditions deteriorate.

Market Sentiment: Regional bank stocks have been highly sentiment-driven since 2023. Negative news – whether industry-wide (e.g. another bank’s issues) or company-specific – can quickly pressure stocks. Comerica’s share price jumped on the merger announcement, but if the deal were to falter for any reason, the stock could retreat to prior levels. Even post-merger, investors might penalize the combined bank if it doesn’t deliver improved returns or if new risks emerge (for example, exposure to areas like commercial payments or wealth management introduces different competitive pressures). Thus, maintaining investor confidence through transparent communication will be key.

Open Questions & Outlook

As Comerica embarks on this new chapter, several open questions will shape its investment thesis:

Can Comerica sustain its dividend through the merger transition? Thus far, the bank has defended its $0.71 quarterly dividend, but will higher capital demands or lower standalone earnings force a rethink? Post-merger, dividend policy will likely align with Fifth Third’s framework – investors will watch if the combined bank keeps a similar payout ratio or adjusts to fund growth.

How effectively will wealth management (WM) expand under the combined bank? The deal is billed as a game-changer for WM, with Comerica’s expertise leading a much larger platform ([1]). Can the new Wealth & Asset Management division truly achieve the targeted ~$1 billion in annual fee revenue ([1])? Success here depends on retaining top advisors, cross-selling to both banks’ client bases, and potentially acquiring new high-net-worth customers. Execution in this area will determine if the “game-changer” promise is realized.

What cost synergies and efficiency gains will be realized? Management needs to deliver on cost-cutting plans (branch consolidations, overhead reductions) without disrupting customer relationships. The timeline and scale of synergy realization will be crucial. If by 2026–2027 the combined bank shows significantly improved efficiency ratios and profitability, it will validate the merger. Conversely, protracted integration or hidden costs could erode the expected benefits. Investors will look for concrete updates on synergy execution each quarter post-close.

How will the combined bank navigate the economic cycle? The next 12–18 months could bring economic uncertainty – anywhere from a soft landing to a mild recession. Loan growth is already soft, and credit costs could rise. Can Comerica (and Fifth Third) weather a downturn without major trouble? Their ability to maintain credit quality and stable deposits during any stress will be a litmus test. If the economy improves or rates moderate, how quickly can the bank pivot back to growth (and possibly reclaim some NIM as deposit pricing normalizes)?

Will more consolidation follow? Comerica’s merger is part of a broader consolidation wave among regionals ([1]). If integration goes well, might the combined bank pursue further acquisitions to scale up versus megabanks? On the flip side, could unexpected issues make the merger a cautionary tale that slows down consolidation? The outcome here could influence the strategy and valuation of other mid-sized banks – a factor that current CMA shareholders (soon to be Fifth Third shareholders) will indirectly be exposed to.

In summary, Comerica’s current standing reflects both its resilience and its challenges. The bank navigated a tumultuous 2023 by shoring up liquidity and maintaining capital, albeit at the cost of higher funding expense and lower profit. It continues to offer shareholders a solid dividend and will soon deliver a merger payday that unlocks additional value ([8]). The forthcoming “green light” from regulators on the Fifth Third deal would mark the culmination of Comerica’s strategy to scale up and diversify – arguably the most significant strategic shift in its modern history. If successful, this game-changing combination could address many of the legacy risks (concentrated funding, reliance on NII, regional scale limits) and open new growth in fee businesses like wealth management ([1]). Still, investors should keep a diligent eye on execution and external conditions. Comerica’s story is evolving, and the next chapters – integration, synergy realization, and economic navigation – will ultimately determine the long-term rewards and risks for its shareholders. The pieces are in place for a stronger franchise; now it’s about delivering on that promise in a rapidly changing banking landscape.

Sources: Comerica SEC filings, investor releases, and credible financial media were used in this report. Key references include Comerica’s 2023 Annual Report (10-K) ([3]) ([3]), Q3 2023 10-Q and investor presentation data, dividend announcements ([2]), and recent news from Reuters and AP on the Fifth Third merger ([1]) ([8]). These sources provide the factual grounding for the analysis of CMA’s financials, dividend policy, capital position, valuation multiples, and the strategic implications of its pending merger.

Sources

  1. https://reuters.com/business/finance/fifth-third-buy-comerica-109-billion-deal-2025-10-06/
  2. https://prnewswire.com/news-releases/comerica-raises-quarterly-dividend-to-71-cents-a-4-percent-increase-301758639.html
  3. https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/28412/000002841224000185/cma-20231231.htm
  4. https://koyfin.com/company/cma/dividends/
  5. https://reuters.com/business/finance/keycorp-profit-falls-higher-deposit-costs-hurt-interest-income-2024-04-18/
  6. https://reuters.com/business/finance/fifth-third-bancorp-quarterly-profit-dips-interest-income-weakness-2024-07-19/
  7. https://in.marketscreener.com/news/comerica-incorporated-declares-quarterly-cash-dividend-on-common-stock-payable-on-october-1-2025-ce7c5fdedc8ef720
  8. https://apnews.com/article/c941c29979fd8251b12ab373261764a4

For informational purposes only; not investment advice.